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A BLUE THAI AFFAIR:  
THE BLUE DIAMOND AFFAIR'S ILLUSTRATION 
OF THE ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE'S 
STANDARDS OF CORRUPTION 
 
Meghan A. McClincy 
*
 
 
 
The Blue Diamond Affair, an international jewelry heist, captivated the world’s 
attention because of its unresolved murders, its implication of law enforcement and 
public officials from two divergent countries, and the resulting diplomatic tensions 
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia. The crime also demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the policies that governed the conduct of the Royal Thai Police Force 
and how the policies allowed, if not perpetuated corruption within the Royal Thai 
Police Force.  This comment provides an overview of the Blue Diamond Affair, 
analyzes the Thai criminal statutes and policies, and explores possible remedies 
for police corruption in Thailand and the application of such remedies more 
broadly. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 With the right casting and a sweeping musical score, "The Blue Diamond 
Affair" could become Hollywood's next blockbuster hit.  The spoiler alert would 
read: "Theft of Saudi heirlooms remains one of Thailand’s biggest unsolved 
mysteries, followed by a bloody trail of destruction implicating some of Thailand’s 
top police generals."1  This great, international "whodunit" occurred more than two 
decades ago and yet many question remain, most importantly, how the Royal Thai 
                                                 
*  Meghan A. McClincy, J.D. candidate 2012, Penn State University Dickinson School of 
Law.  I would like to thank Kevin & Lisa McClincy and Michael & Traci McClincy for their love, 
support, and most importantly – their patience.  I would also like to thank Bryce Miles, Matthew Kita, 
and the entire JLIA Editorial Board & Staff for their editing assistance throughout the writing 
process.  
1  Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy to Settle 20-year Jewellery Theft, WORLD BULLETIN, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=52473 [hereinafter Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy]. 
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Police Force remained unscathed. 2   In Thailand, the most sensational crimes 
frequently involve the Thai police as prime suspects.3  
  
 The comment begins with an overview of "The Blue Diamond Affair."  
Here, the background of the heist and subsequent unsolved murders will be 
described. 4   The comment then addresses the crime's international ramifications 
including: the delegated chargé d'affaires; 5  a damaged diplomatic relationship 
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia; and the detrimental effects the failing diplomacy 
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia has had on Thai citizens,6 including the adverse 
effects on Thai workers and business industries.7 
  
 The second part of the comment analyzes Thai police policies and statutes, 
which allow, if not perpetuate, corruption within the Thai police force.8  Specifically, 
this section will demonstrate how Thai police officials interpret statutes to promote 
and insulate corrupt agents within the police force and protect unethical practices 
from outside probes.  The section also explains how Thai police craft statutes, which 
on their face advance crooked policies. 
  
 The comment's final section will explore how corruption within the Thai 
police force can be remedied.9  Measures of reform include training and education by 
international organizations such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Bangkok, Thailand; solidarity with and political influence from the Thai citizen-ran 
government organization, the Public Anti-Corruption Commission; and the impact 
and social utility of the private sector, including the Thai Institute of Directors. 
 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BLUE DIAMOND AFFAIR 
 
A.  The Theft of the Jewelry 
 
 The mystery begins in 1989 when Kriangkrai Techamong, a Thai gardener 
and janitor working in one of the palaces of Saudi Prince Faisal bin Fahd, crawled 
into a bedroom and stole some 200 pounds of jewelry.10  The stash of precious 
                                                 
2  See id. 
3   See The Thai Police; A Law Unto Themselves, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/11058580 [hereinafter Law Unto Themselves]. 
4  See infra pp. 2-8. 
5  See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (9th ed. 2009).  A chargé d'affaire is a diplomat who is 
second in command in a diplomatic mission.     
6.  See Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy, supra note 1. 
7  See Saudi Envoy Appreciates Thai Court Efforts in Missing Businessman Case, BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, Jan. 13, 2010 [hereinafter Saudi Envoy] (explaining the importance Thai workers have 
on Saudi industry).     
8  See infra pp. 8-20. 
9  See infra pp. 19-27. 
10   Andrew Marshall, The Curse of the Blue Diamond, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall/2010/09/22/the-curse-of-the-blue-diamond/. 
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jewels and gems included a famous and rare blue diamond.11  Kriangkrai stuffed the 
loot, including the precious blue diamond,12 into a vacuum cleaner bag13 and shipped 
them back to Thailand via DHL.  He fled Saudi Arabia soon thereafter.14  
 
 Upon arriving in Lampang, a province in Northern Thailand, Kriangkrai had 
a difficult time disposing of the stolen goods.15  Consequently, he sold the individual 
pieces at incredibly low prices.16  Santhi Sithanakan, a local jeweler, caught word of 
Kriangkrai's collection17 and purchased the bulk of the gems at a fraction of their 
value.18  
  
 By this time, Saudi royals realized they had been robbed and notified 
Thailand authorities about Kriangkrai.19  While it did not take long for Thai officials 
to arrest the thief, Kriangkrai had already sold the jewels to Santhi.20  Then, through 
Kriangkrai, a team of police led by Lieutenant-General Chalor Kerdthes (Chalor) 
tracked down Santhi and quickly announced recovery of the jewels.21  Kriangkrai was 
sentenced to seven years in jail.22  Despite the arrest and proclaimed recovery of the 
jewels, Saudi Arabia dispatched three diplomats, 23  Abdullah Al-Besri, Fahad AZ 
Albahli, Ahmed A Alsaid, and a private citizen and businessman trusted by the royal 
family, Mohammad al-Ruwail, to Bangkok to investigate the theft.24 
 
B.  The Subsequent Murders 
 
 On February 1, 1990, one of the Saudi diplomats, Adbullah Al-Besri was 
killed in Bangkok.25  Ten minutes later, the two other Saudi diplomats – Fahad AZ 
Albahli and Ahmed A Alsaif – were assassinated in Bangkok.26  During the same 
                                                 
11   See Treasures of the World: Hope Diamond, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/treasuresoftheworld/a_nav/hope_nav/hnav_level_2/level2_pitch_science_hop
frm.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (explaining the rarity and high value of blue diamonds). 
12  See Christopher Shay, Thailand's Blue Diamond Heist: Still a Sore Point, TIME, Mar. 7, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1969920,00.html.  Thailand's Department of 
Special Investigation (DSI) cannot confirm whether the Saudi princess' rare blue diamond exists.     
13  See id.  The former Saudi chargé d'affaires told the Washington Post that the Thai worker 
stuffed "rubies the size of chicken eggs" in the vacuum cleaner bag.  Id. 
14  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
15  See id. 
16  See id.  Kriangkrai allegedly sold a few of the priceless jewels for thirty dollars.   
17  See Terry McCarthy, Saudi Gems Theft Leaves Deadly Trail in Thailand, THE INDEPENDENT 
(LONDON), Sept. 25, 1994, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saudi-gems-theft-
leaves-deadly-trail-in-thailand-1450865.html.  Rumors circulated that Kriangkrai's loot included 
diamond-studded watches, necklaces heavy with jewels, and one fifty-carat diamond.   
18  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
19  See Shay, supra note 12. 
20  See id. 
21  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
22  See Shay, supra note 12.  Kriangkrai's sentence was later reduced to three years because he 
confessed to the crime.  
23   See Timeline of the Blue Diamond Affair, JOTMAN.COM (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://jotman.blogspot.com/2009/08/timeline-of-blue-diamond-affair.html [hereinafter Timeline]. 
24  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
25  See Timeline, supra note 23. 
26  See id. 
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month, Ruwaili, the Saudi businessman, disappeared, presumably murdered.27  The  
four murders remain unsolved.28   
 
 Saudis suspected that the Thai police were involved in the murders of the 
men and, in response, Saudi Arabia downgraded diplomatic relations with Thailand 
and assigned a terse chargé d’affaires, Mohammed Said Khoja, to Bangkok to 
investigate the murders and the theft.29  Khoja concluded that all four Saudis had 
discovered important information about what had happened to the jewels and had 
been murdered30 by Thai government officials to silence them.31  
 
 A month after the four murders, Chalor announced that the police had 
discovered the remaining jewels and flew with a delegation to Saudi Arabia to return 
the jewels to Prince Faisal.32  Chalor and his police team returned the jewels to Saudi 
Arabia in "a public ceremony, designed to show how efficiently they had done their 
job, and to strengthen the cordial relations between Thailand and the Gulf state."33  
Despite the grand public display of rapprochement, Saudi officials soon discovered 
that the returned gems were fake, 34  replaced by paste replicas and that the blue 
diamond was still missing.35  
  
 Under pressure from the Saudis, the Thai police force continued to 
investigate the unsolved theft and subsequent murders.36  In 1994, jeweler Santhi was 
kidnapped and tortured upon the orders of Chalor. 37   Not long afterwards, the 
bodies of Santhi's wife and fourteen-year-old son were found in their wrecked 
vehicle on a highway just outside Bangkok.38  Thai police forensic officers declared 
the deaths to be the result of an automobile accident; however, later autopsies 
demonstrated the victims died from blows to the head,39 suggesting the deaths were 
staged and that the police forensic officers lied.40  The Washington Post quoted the 
former Saudi chargé d'affaires, "[t]he forensic commander thinks we're stupid.  This 
was not an accident."41  
 
                                                 
27  See id. 
28  See Marshall, supra note 10.  
29  See Timeline, supra note 23. 
30  See Shay, supra note 12.  The United States non-governmental organization, Foundation 
for Democracy in Iran, claimed in a 1996 report that the 1990 murders of the Saudi diplomats were 
the result of Iranian hit squads.  The DSI, which took over the case from the Thai police in 2004, said 
the alleged Iranian connection to the murders was a meritless rumor.  
31  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
32  See Shay, supra note 12. 
33  McCarthy, supra note 17. 
34  See Shay, supra note 12.  Local Thai press reported rumors of circulating photos of 
bureaucrats' wives wearing new diamond necklaces at a Thai charity event.  Allegedly, the necklaces 
were uncannily similar to the stolen pieces. 
35  See id. 
36  See id. 
37  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
38  See id. 
39  See id. 
40  See id.   
41  Shay, supra note 12.   
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 A few months later, Chalor was arrested by the Thai police and charged with 
ordering the murders of the jeweler's wife and son.42  Chalor was later convicted of 
receiving the stolen gems.  Although the Thai Supreme Court upheld his conviction 
and death sentence in October 2009,43 Chalor continues to maintain his innocence 
on the theft and murder charges.44  
 
 Despite Chalor's conviction and criminal sentence, Thai-Saudi relations 
remain strained.  As the twenty-year statute of limitations that applies to Mohammed 
al-Ruwaili’s murder nears its end, there appears to be progress towards solving the 
case.  In 2000, the investigation into the theft and subsequent murders was reopened 
under the lead of the Thai Department of Special Investigations (DSI).  In January 
2010, the Office of the Attorney General indicted a senior policeman, Lieutenant-
General Somkid Boonthanom, chief of police for Thailand's Region 5, for the 
murder of Saudi businessman Ruwaili.45  Four other policemen have been indicted 
and all five are awaiting trial.46  However, in September 2010, despite his indictment, 
Somkid was promoted to the post of assistant national police chief. 47   The 
promotion of an indicted murdered caused disbelief and frustration throughout the 
Saudi government.48  
 
C.  The Damaged Diplomatic Relationship and Its Ramifications 
 
 Following the unsettled theft of the royal jewels and unsolved murders of 
their fellow statesmen, Saudi Arabia downgraded its diplomatic relations with 
Thailand.49  Consequently, Saudi Arabia banned the recruitment of Thai workers, 
prohibited its citizens from traveling to Thailand, stopped all its national carrier's 
flights to Bangkok, and ordered its businesspersons to replace Thai employees with 
other workers.50  Inevitably, these restrictions caused a sharp drop in the number of 
Thai workers51 in Saudi Arabia; specifically, the number of Thai workers dropped 
from 200,000 in 1989 to merely 10,000 in 2011.52  The Saudis intended the reduced 
diplomatic presence in Bangkok to be a sign of protest until justice was served with 
                                                 
42  See id.  During the trial it emerged that four men had confessed to carrying out the 
murders on the orders of police, and that police had tried to extort a $2.5 million ransom from the 
jeweler. 
43  See id. 
44  See id. Chalor told the Times of London that, "Not all people in jail are guilty."  Id. 
However, he remains in prison, where he has put together a band and recorded a Thai cover of Elvis 
Presley's "Jailhouse Rock."  See id. 
45   See Deputy PM Suthep's Letter to Ashri, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 23, 2010, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/197716/deputy-pm-suthep-letter-to-ashri [hereinafter 
Letter]. 
46  See Marshall, supra note 10. 
47  See id. 
48  See id.  The promotion contention will be further explored in the second section. 
49  See The Missing Pillar in Thai-Gulf Ties, GULF NEWS, May 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
8303469 (WL). 
50  See id. 
51  See Thai PM Meets Saudi Envoy, supra note 1. 
52.  See id. 
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the perpetrators behind bars or at the very least "until their names and their lives 
were ruined."53   
 
 Thailand's airline industry has suffered because of the weak diplomatic ties 
between the two nations. 54   In September 2009, Thai Airways International 
executives attempted to negotiate a plan for resuming non-stop flights between 
Bangkok and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.55  However, the airline’s efforts were in vain; the 
Riyadh's reaction revealed, "unspoken, but clear disapproval" due to continued 
dissatisfaction with the Thai authorities' response to the unsolved jewelry theft and 
resulting murders.56  In spite of the international turmoil between the two countries, 
Saudi Arabia allows Thai Airways to provide a limited number of flights between the 
two countries on a chartered basis mainly for pilgrims57 to Mecca.58  Nonetheless, 
Thai Airways left the negotiation realizing it may be better off not trying to re-
establish service in spite of the bid's lucrative potential.59  
 
 Regardless of persisting diplomatic gridlock, the Thai government continued 
to make efforts to amend relations.60  In July 2010, a Thai government official, the 
Democrat Party MP for Phitsanulok and advisor to the House Committee on Labor 
Affairs, prepared to seek Saudi Arabian King Abdullah's forgiveness for Thailand's 
failure to solve the cases of the missing jewelry and the murder of Saudi diplomats.61  
The formal apology, signed by the committee and thirteen labor organizations, 
sought the King's pardon in order to restore diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.62  Similarly, in August 2010, the Thai Deputy Ministry of Commerce met 
with Saudi officials to discuss future economic collaboration at both private and 
public levels.63  The Ministry also met with Saudi Arabia’s largest rice importers to 
pen agreements on the purchase of Thai rice.64  
 
 Even though individual Thai government agencies have made strides in 
navigating the channels of international clemency and cooperation, the Thai police 
have continued to thwart any prospects for alliance and amnesty.  By examining Thai 
statutes and police regulations, the comment's next section will demonstrate how 
                                                 
53  Id.   
54 See Direct Saudi Flights Elusive, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 10, 2009, available at A200909092D-
1D6E0-GNW (LEXIS) [hereinafter Direct Saudi Flights]. 
55  See id. 
56  Id. 
57 See Saudi Arabia to Issue Hajj Visas for Thai Pilgrims, NATION (BANGKOK), Sept. 24, 2010, 
http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=14528.  Despite recent speculation that Saudi 
Arabia would deny visas for Thai pilgrim, the Saudi Arabian embassy promised it would issue visas for 
all 13,000 Thai Muslims planning to go on the Hajj pilgrimage.   
58  See Direct Saudi Flights, supra note 54. 
59  See id. 
60   See Thailand Steps Up Efforts to Restore Diplomatic Ties With Saudi Arabia, THAI PRESS 
REPORTS, July 23, 2010, available at A2010072357-20A4C-GNW (LEXIS). 
61  See id. 
62  See id. 
63   See id. 
64  See Thailand, Saudi Arabia to Form Joint Business Council, FNWEB.COM, Aug. 6, 2010, available 
at A20100806B-20C9A-GNW (LEXIS). 
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Thailand's police directive promulgates corruption within the Thai police force, 
making resolution of the theft and subsequent murders unlikely if not impossible.65 
 
II.  CORRUPTION AND THE ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE 
 
 The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) declares that all citizens, 
including state agencies and officials, must be uniformly held accountable under the 
rule of law, and only then will citizens' rights and dignities be protected.66  Under a 
system of law enforcement, as in the United States, citizens' rights and dignities are 
safeguarded.  However, Thailand follows a system of order-enforcement;67 and under 
order-enforcement, citizens are not ensured the same liberties and protections.68  To 
implement a uniform and effective system of justice, the Thai police must transform 
from a system of order-enforcement to a system of law enforcement.69 
  
 Under order-enforcement, the idea of burden of proof is irrelevant, a 
standard procedure for criminal investigations is inessential, and unequal treatment 
and due process and equal treatment are fictional concepts. 70  Antithetically, law 
enforcement requires thorough criminal investigations, submission of evidence, and 
consistent protection of civil liberties.71  Under its current standards of operation, 
Thailand's police force preserves a system of order-enforcement by allowing the 
practice of torture, implicating witnesses, inhibiting the role of prosecution, and 
promoting corrupt state agents. 
 
A.  Practice of Torture          
 
 Currently, Thailand has no specific legal provision penalizing torture. 72  
Despite recent talks of negotiation,73 Thailand has yet to ratify the U.N. Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.74  A common justification of torture is that it is the cheapest method of 
criminal investigation.75  Under this "might equals right"76 principle, the Thai police 
                                                 
65  See infra pp. 9-20. 
 66  See Asian Human Rights Commission, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Asia, (2006), at 7, 
http://www.ahrchk.net/pub/pdf/RoL_HRinAsia.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights in Asia]. 
 67  See id. 
 68   See id. 
 69   See id. at 50. 
70  See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 66. 
 71   See id. 
72  See id. at 27.  
 73   See ASSOCIATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE, THAILAND: Implementing the UN 
Convention Against Torture, (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.apt.ch/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=874:thailand-implementing-the-un-
convention-against-torture&Itemid=227&lang=en.  The Association for the Prevention of Torture 
(APT) is a non-governmental organization that seeks to open all places of detention to international 
and national scrutiny.  See id.  In May 2009, the APT organized training workshops in Bangkok in aims 
to garner support and action for the implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture in 
Thailand.  See id.  The workshop constructed a three-year plan of action for the implementation of the 
U.N. Convention Against Torture.  See id. 
 74   See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66 at 27. 
75  See id. at 68.   
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force values physical power over brain power because it is a less costly investigative 
practice.77  Along with the fact that policing by coercion is less costly for the Thai 
police force, it is also promoted by the Thai government.78  During Thailand's 2003 
war on drugs, the Thai government incited police and public officials to organize and 
endorse murder in the name of ridding the nation of drugs.79  The police officers 
were encouraged to unlawfully execute alleged drug dealers through the promise of 
financial rewards, promotions, and threats of transfers and dismissals.80  Specifically, 
then Prime Minister Thaskin Shinawatra, made a series of public statements 
portraying drug-dealers as sub-humans who deserved to die.81  In the end, Thailand's 
war on drugs took 2,500 lives.82  The events of Thailand's war on drugs demonstrate 
that those in the government expect the police to be their puppets in achieving their 
policy demands.   
  
 The Thai government demands their police to accomplish the government's 
goals by any means necessary.83  Therefore, the complicity of the police seriously 
undermines acceptable principles of the rule of law and instead approves the practice 
of torture.  Meaning, if the individuals torturing citizens are the same ones who are 
supposed to protect citizens, chaos and corruption ensues, enabling backdoor 
murders and mysterious disappearances of criminal defendants, victims, and 
witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
76  Interview with Bryce Miles, International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Deputy 
Director (Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Interview].  Mr. Miles is currently assigned in Bangkok, Thailand 
where he has serves as a Diplomatic Security Special Agent.  See id.  He has a B.A. in Political Science 
from Louisiana State University, 1991, and an M.S. in Strategic Intelligence, National Defense 
Intelligence College, 2008.  See id.  It should also be noted that Mr. Miles conferred with outside 
sources, including a senior Thai national United States Embassy employee, a retired Thai police 
general, and a Thai police colonel to provide answers to interview questions.  See id.  Regarding the 
application process to become a Royal Thai policeman, Mr. Miles said that, "it's not terribly difficult 
to be selected as a regular Thai policeman."  Id.  He equated the level of difficulty to enlisting in the 
United States Army.  See id.      
77  See id.  Mr. Miles explained that police training in Thailand is not up to United States 
standards for two reasons: 1) the culture does not encourage active student participation or 
resourcefulness; and 2) the Thai police force lacks the required budget and assets to train the "hard 
skills," needed for complex investigations and police raids.  Id. 
 78   See ASIAN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE, Thailand: "Unsubstantiated" Police Abuse, Impunity and 
Human Rights Charades, (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_st2009/577 
[hereinafter Unsubstantiated].   
 79   See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 55.  Through a series of memos, official orders, 
and public statements, the Thai police were directed to organize and carry out the ordered murders.  
 80   See id. at 55. 
 81   See id. at 56-57.  The Prime Minister said, "We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their 
[drug dealers] assets as well, so their sinful inheritance will not be passed on."  Id.  He also stated, 
"Don't be moved by the high death figures.  We must be adamant and finish this war . . . When you 
go to war and some of your enemies die, you cannot become soft-hearted, otherwise the surviving 
enemy will return to kill you."  Id. 
 82   See Unsubstantiated, supra note 72. 
 83   See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 57. 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:1 
 
 190 
B.  Lack of Witness Protection 
 
 Though Thailand has witness-protection legislation,84 the existence of such 
legislation does not necessarily translate into its enforcement or protection for 
citizens. 85   Thailand's witness protection legislation, Witness Protection Act B.E. 
2546 (2003), offers little more than a thumbnail sketch of the necessities and 
practices for witness protection.86  Specifically, Section 244 affirms that in a criminal 
case a witness has "the right to protection, proper treatment, necessary and 
appropriate remuneration from the State as provided by law."87  However, the Act 
does not outline, in detail, any of the practical steps or issues arising from witness 
protection.88  Additionally, the Act fails to consider what measures should be taken 
to ensure protection or what standard should be used to provide protection.89  The 
failure of specificity leaves the door open for disparities in methods of dealing with 
witness protection.90   
 
 Moreover, the Act's ambiguous definition of "witness,"91 serves as a catalyst 
for inconsistency.92  Specifically, the exclusion of "defendants" from the definition of 
persons who may seek protection is alarming.  In Thailand, many defendants fall 
victim to unlawful treatment, such as forced self-incrimination, doctored evidence, 
and fraudulent record-keeping.93  Given the Royal Thai Police's infamous reputation 
for corruption,94 these potential victims are among the persons in greatest need of 
protection.95  Officially, in Section 13,96 the statute establishes a Witness Protection 
Office.97  The Witness Protection Office works in a supervisory capacity with other 
                                                 
 84   See HUMAN RIGHTS CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, Lesson 2: Case Study of Thailand's Fledgling 
Witness Protection Programme, http://www.hrschool.org/doc/mainfile.php/lesson47/184/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Lesson 2].  This lesson analyzes Thailand's Office of Witness Protection as a 
case study, based on the report, Protecting Witnesses or Perverting Justice?, by the Asian Legal Resource 
Centre, June 2006.  See id.  
 85   See id. 
 86   See id. 
 87   Id. 
 88   See id. 
 89   See Lesson 2, supra note 84. 
 90   See id. 
 91   See id.  The Act defines "witness" as "a person who commits himself/herself to be present 
at, or testify, or give evidence to a competent official for investigation, a criminal interrogation, a 
court for criminal proceedings, and includes an expert but not a defendant who himself/herself is a 
witness."  [Unofficial translation].  Id. 
 92   See id. 
 93   See id.  While the Act was enacted to prevent intimidation and threats against witnesses, 
the Act does not specifically address or define these issues.  See id.  Furthermore, Sections 21 and 23 
establish light penalties for revealing the identity of witnesses, intimidating them, or causing harm or 
death; however, "harm" is never qualified.   Id. 
 94   See A Law Unto Themselves, supra note 3. 
 95   See Lesson 2, supra note 84. 
 96   See id.  Section 5 states, "the Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Interior and Justice 
shall be in charge of enforcement of this Act and, in relation to their respective Ministries, shall have 
the power to appoint competent officials issue Ministerial Regulations and notifications for the 
purposes of the Implementation of this Act."  Id.  The Act gives no direct guidance on how these 
agencies are to cooperate.  See id.  
 97   See id. 
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governmental agencies, such as the Thai police. 98   In principle, the Act ensures 
protection for witnesses and victims; in practice, the protection is to be provided by 
the police, a group known for . . ..99 
  
 The Act does force the police to provide protection; rather, it is left to their 
discretion to accept or reject such requests.100  Once a case is accepted, the police 
obtain complete control; the police determine if protection is to be offered; the 
extent of protection to be provided, and the duration of the protection.101  The 
police monopoly on power, without definitive and administered regulations, 
undermines the purpose of the statute and consequently endangers the witness.102  
The statute's intended objective is further impaired by the statute's stringent 
deadlines.103  Short-term protection may be inadequate in some cases, such as the 
Blue Diamond Affair, which has taken years to work through the courts. 104  
Furthermore, post-trial protection may be paramount to protect the livelihood of a 
criminal witness or victim.105  As the statute operates now, it fails to accomplish its 
stated goal to protect witnesses.  Consequently, allegedly innocent individuals, such 
as Santhi's wife and fourteen year old son, are left unguarded, in jeopardy, and 
frequently go missing.106  
 
C.  Compromised Role of Prosecutors 
 
 In Thailand, the role of prosecutor has been undermined by the power of 
high political authorities.  In the United States, prosecutors have an active role in 
criminal proceedings; prosecutors file the criminal charge and remain involved in the 
investigation of the crime.107  Moreover, prosecutors thoroughly review the evidence 
to confirm that evidence is obtained by lawful means, to ensure that the criminal 
defendants', victims', and witnesses' human dignities and rights are preserved during 
the investigative process, and to hold responsible and bring to justice those who fail 
to comply with the two standards listed above.108   
 
                                                 
 98   See id. 
 99   See id. 
 100   See Lesson 2, supra note 84. 
 101   See id. 
102  See id. 
103  See id.  After the witness protection officer contacts the police and the police accept the 
case, existing regulations provide protection up to twenty-one days.  See id.  Beyond the initial twenty-
one days, the commissioner can provide further protection for an additional sixty days.  See id.  For 
protection beyond eighty-one days, approval from the police commissioner-general is required.  See id. 
 104   See id. 
 105   See Lesson 2, supra note 84. 
 106   See Interview, supra note 76.  Mr. Miles said that the Thai Department of Justice is currently 
planning and funding a Thai Marshals Service.  See id.  The new agency's mission and legal authorities 
will follow exactly those of the United States Marshall's service.  See id.   
 107   See generally Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 105-06. 
 108   See id. at 108. 
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 In Thailand, however, public prosecutors face many problems when 
addressing human-rights cases, as pointed out by the AHRC.109  Under the color of 
law, public prosecutors often work closely with the investigating agencies to assure 
that cases are derailed, especially cases that implicate state officers.110   
  
 In the Blue Diamond Affair, after the assigned inquiry team determined that 
Somkid should not be prosecuted, the public prosecutor issued an order of non-
prosecution due to insufficient evidence.111  The public prosecutor then referred the 
file to the Director-General of the Royal Thai Police Department in accordance with 
Article 145, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states,  
 
In case there is an issue of a non-prosecution order other than that of 
the Director-General of the Public Prosecution Department, if it is in 
the Nakhorn Luang Krungtep Dhonburi [Bangkok], it is in 
the...[Bangkok]the file of inquiry together with the order shall 
forthwith be submitted to the Director-General, Deputy Director-
General or Assistant Director-General of the Royal Thai Police 
Department.112 
 
The Director-General then reviewed the case and decided not to dissent from the 
non-prosecution order of the public prosecutor.113  Nonetheless, in May 2000, the 
Board of Special Cases of the Department of Special Investigations (DSI),114 decided 
that the murder cases of the Saudi Arabian diplomats and businessmen should be 
reopened as Special Cases under Article 21, Paragraph 1(2), of the Special 
Investigation Act B.E. 2547 (1990). 115   In addition, under Article 32, the Act 
stipulates that the public prosecutor shall participate in the investigation. 116  
Subsequently, the public prosecutor decided to prosecute Police General Somkid.117  
  
 The incidents of the Blue Diamond Affair reflect a well-known contention 
that exists between the DSI and public prosecutors.118  In Thailand, it is common 
practice for public prosecutors to scrutinize the investigative officers' work, decline 
                                                 
 109    See ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Thailand: Investigators Cannot Be Allowed to 
Override Prosecutors, (June 19, 2007), 
http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2007statements/1073/ [hereinafter Override 
Prosecutors].  
 110   See id. 
 111   See Letter, supra note 45. 
 112   Id. 
 113   See id. 
 114   See Interview, supra note 76.  Mr. Miles explained that the DSI is assigned cases exclusively 
via the Special Investigation Act of B.E. 2547 (2004) (Thai).  See id.  Under this statute, the Special 
Case Advisory committee decides which cases are assigned to the DSI.  See id.  DSI predominantly 
focuses on white collar crime, corruption allegations, investigations of high profile political officers, 
terrorism, and large scale institutional money laundering.  See id.    
 115   See id. 
 116   See id. 
 117   See id. 
 118   See Override Prosecutors, supra note 103. 
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cases, and argue that there is insufficient evidence.119  Conversely, DSI agents120 argue 
that the prosecutors' decision is a disingenuous obstacle to the court.121  However, it 
is irrelevant which side is "right."  In the end, the conflict between these law 
enforcement entities undermines the role of prosecution and thwarts its purpose of 
ensuring justice.  Similarly, justice is further compromised when corruption by 
officials is not only tolerated but also promoted.    
 
D.  Promotion of Corrupt State Agents 
 
 As explained earlier, the Blue Diamond Affair seemed to be making progress 
when, in January 2010, the Attorney General indicted senior policeman Somkid and 
four other policemen for the disappearance of Saudi-Arabian businessman 
Mohammad al-Ruwaili.122  Sadly, this brief moment of hope was cut short in late 
September 2010 when Thai government officials announced that Somkid, despite his 
recent indictment, had been promoted to the post of assistant national police chief.123  
To be expected, the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok responded with outrage and 
disappointment.124 
  
 The Saudi Embassy issued a press release in which it questioned if the 
promotion was granted in accordance with Thai law.125  The embassy cited Article 95 
of the Thai National Police Act 2547 B.E., which declares that any police officer 
who is alleged of or charged with breaching severe discipline or committing a 
criminal act will be ordered to quit his post until the completion of the legal 
proceedings.126  The press release noted the embassy’s astonishment that, despite the 
clear purpose and objective of Article 95, the Thai government has not shown any 
intention of taking disciplinary action against the police officers.127  The embassy 
further expressed concerns that the high-ranking officer accused in the case was 
promoted to a position that may affect the course of legal proceedings against him.128  
Consequently, the embassy warned that the promotion might seriously jeopardize the 
restoration of bilateral relations between the countries.129   
  
                                                 
 119   See id. 
 120   Interview, supra note 76.  Mr. Miles explained that the DSI is considered more professional 
and less corrupt than the Royal Thai Police.  See id.  DSI has about 300 specialized investigators and is 
currently expanding to nearly 500 specialized investigators.  See id.  DSI's screening and hiring process 
is also more rigorous and competitive than the police forces' application and hiring process.  See id.   
 121   See Override Prosecutors, supra note 103. 
 122   See Marshall, supra note 10. 
 123   See id. 
 124   See id. 
 125   See Press Release, Royal Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Bangkok, Thailand, 
Response to Gen. Somkid Boonthanom's Recent Promotion (Sept. 3, 2010) 
(http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=113946) [hereinafter Embassy’s Response].  
 126   See id. 
 127   Id. 
 128   Id. 
 129   See id. 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:1 
 
 194 
 A few days later, the Saudi Embassy issued a follow up press release.130  The 
embassy emphasized that while the Saudi government did not intend to meddle in 
Thailand's internal affairs, the Saudi Embassy would monitor the progress of the 
investigations by the Thai authorities to uncover the mysteries that surround the 20-
year-old cases. 131   The letter emphasized Saudi Arabia's hope that "witness 
transparency, justice, and non-interference" 132  will be applied to the cases that 
directly concern the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.133   
  
 In a failed attempt to ease suspicion and turmoil, Deputy Prime Minister 
Suthep Thaugsuban (PM Suthep) issued an explanation of the recent promotion.134  
PM Suthep explained that because the Royal Thai Police Department had ceased all 
disciplinary proceedings in November 1998, Royal Thai Police could no longer 
conduct disciplinary proceedings against Somkid. 135   Specifically, because the 
investigation occurred before the Royal Thai Police Act B.E. 2547 (2004) was 
enacted, the matter fell in line with Article 6 of the Absolution Act B.E. (2007) 
(Absolution Act).136  The Absolution Act states, "persons subjected to disciplinary 
action where his or her superior officials ordered the termination of the case or the 
commutation of sentence on or before the 5th December B.E. 2550 (2007) shall not 
be further imposed additional punishment or disciplinary action against them on that 
particular case."137  Consequently, PM Suthep explained that the Royal Thai Police 
could no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings against Somkid since he was 
investigated and punished before the Absolution Act's passing in 2007.138 
 
 In response, Mr. Nabil Ashir, the current chargé d'affaires of the Saudi 
Embassy in Bangkok, said, "[e]very time I meet a Thai official, a different article of 
law or law or set of laws is mentioned to me . . . . "139  Mr. Ashri further noted, "the 
purpose of the laws, regulations, and the constitution is to benefit the general public 
and not a certain individual."140  He reiterated that the Saudi government is not 
aiming to interfere with the Thai government; however, he asked for empathy for 
Saudi Arabia's frustration, stating, "this particular case [of Mr. Al-Ruwaili] had been 
classified as a special case according to the Thai justice system, so far we have seen 
nothing special about it . . . . "141 
 
 Whether due to public pressure or his own good conscience, Somkid 
declined to accept his appointment as Assistant National Police Chief in order to 
                                                 
 130   See Embassy's Response, supra note 125. 
 131   See id. 
 132   Id. 
 133   See id. 
 134   See Letter, supra note 45. 
 135   See id. 
 136   See id. 
 137   Id. 
 138   See id. 
 139   Embassy’s Response, supra note 125. 
140  Id. 
 141   Id. 
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defuse the tension between the two countries.142  However, not even a week after his 
decline, Somkid was offered and accepted a promotion to be the Police Inspector-
General.143 
 
 It is unclear why Thailand, a country infamous for its corrupt police force144 
would pass legislation like the Absolution Act, 145  which essentially clears police 
conduct which occurred pre-2007.  At its core, the Absolution Act functions as a 
"get out of jail free" card, which conveniently benefited Somkid.  Though Somkid is 
currently under a Special Case Investigation and is indicted for murder,146 the police 
disciplinary immunity under the Absolution Act allows him to not only maintain 
employment as a police officer, but also be considered for a highly revered 
promotion.147  Furthermore, it is perplexing why a nation would grant a substantial 
promotion to a police officer who is currently charged with murdering a foreign 
nation's diplomatic envoy.148  However, in Thailand, corruption is so deeply rooted 
within the government that the most sensational crimes frequently involve the Thai 
police as prime suspects.149  Hence, while the quantifiable repercussions of Thailand's 
inner-government corruption can be identified, the remedies for the government's 
misconduct are not as easily ascertained.   
 
 The next section will explore a few of the remedial measures in place, which 
aim to turn Thailand's criminal investigation and prosecution regime from a 
haphazard system of order-enforcement to an effectual system of law 
enforcement.150  Analyzed reform efforts include law enforcement training facilitated 
by the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand; political 
corruption investigations conducted by the Thai government's Public Anti-
Corruption Commission; and the impact and social utility of Thailand's private 
sector.    
 
III.  REMEDIAL MEASURES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION WITHIN THE 
ROYAL THAI POLICE FORCE 
 
A.  International Law Enforcement Academy, Bangkok, Thailand  
  
 Although recent strides in technology have made the world smaller, the same 
technological advancements have allowed international crime to emerge stronger 
than ever.  Organized crime operations colonize in countries with weak governments 
and developing economies.  To combat this new era of widespread international 
                                                 
 142   See Pol Lt Gen Somkid Named as Inspector-General, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Sept. 27, 2010, 
available at A2010092425-214A9-GNW (LEXIS).  Somkid became Inspector-General as of Oct. 1, 
2010.  
 143   See id. 
 144   See A Law Unto Themselves, supra note 3. 
 145   See Embassy's Response, supra note 125. 
 146   See Marshall, supra note 10. 
 147   See Letter, supra note 45. 
 148   See Marshall, supra note 10. 
 149   See A Law Unto Themselves, supra note 3. 
 150   See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 66, at 7. 
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crime, the United States developed a training agency, which seeks to train and 
empower law enforcement officers with little to no experience, to organize law 
enforcement units which operate efficiently, and to secure social order and protect 
human rights.151  The U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) chair the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA). 152   INL, along with law enforcement representatives from the State 
Department, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the 
United States Treasury, select ILEA's targeted countries or areas of interest.153  Along 
with promoting law enforcement cooperation between the United States and 
targeted foreign nation, the Academy aims to: (1) provide professional law 
enforcement training specifically tailored to meet the needs of the region; and (2) 
facilitate professional law enforcement relationships among participants, both 
internally and across international borders.154  ILEA's main areas of interest include 
narcotics, terrorism, and transnational crime. 155   ILEA focuses on operational 
training, such as criminal investigation strategies and current technology for evidence 
forensics.156   
  
 Through ILEA’s work in Thailand, the level of professionalism has 
improved significantly in the Royal Thai Police Force. 157  In light of this recent 
success, ILEA is considering creating and sponsoring courses that focus on 
combating corruption. 158   However, because corruption is woven so intricately 
throughout the police force, ILEA is quite aware that it will take years, if ever, to 
reform the "corporate culture" of patronage and corruption.159 
 
 Bryce Miles, Deputy Director of ILEA, Bangkok, explains that, "[c]orruption 
is just the way [the Royal Thai Police Force] [does] business."160  Mr. Miles explains 
that though the police force, in general, is professional and cooperates well with 
ILEA, its ethos is, "[w]hat is in it for us?  Can we make a profit?"161  For example, if 
a Thai police officer stops a citizen for an illegal turn, and the citizen asks to 
immediately pay the fine, the police officer will personally pocket the money, and the 
matter will be settled without citation, record, or court appearance. 162   These 
occurrences result in widespread distrust of the police.163  The relationship between 
the Thai citizen and Thai police officer cannot be defined as antagonistic, but instead 
as apathetic, understanding that "this is the way they [Royal Thai Police Force 
officers] are."164   
                                                 
 151   See Interview, supra note 76. 
 152   See id. 
 153   See id. 
 154   See id. 
 155   See id. 
 156  Interview, supra note 76. 
 157   See id. 
 158   See id. 
 159   Id. 
 160   Id. 
 161  Interview, supra note 76. 
 162   See id. 
 163   See id. 
 164   Id. 
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 Despite the citizens' apathy towards the rampant corruption within the police 
force, both Thai citizens and the Thai government are concerned about the negative 
media attention, especially press articles that may have a damaging effect on 
Thailand's tourist industry, an important component of the country's economy.165  
Such concerns are the impetus behind the Thai government's recent efforts to 
combat corruption, including the establishment of the Public Anti-Corruption 
Commission.166 
 
B.  Public Anti-Corruption Commission 
 
 Thailand's current prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, recently addressed the 
Fourteenth Annual International Corruption Conference in Bangkok. 167   In his 
speech, the prime minster said:  
 
The fight against corruption is a moral one and cannot be won by 
legislation alone.  We can have the best anti-corruption laws and 
strictest enforcement in place, but if large sections of the population 
remain persistently indifferent and apathetic about corruption, I’m 
afraid we will continue to face an uphill battle.  Let us be reminded of 
these words of wisdom –– “the accomplice to the crime of 
corruption is frequently our own indifference”.168                    
 
The prime minister is right; apathy is a significant obstacle to any reform movement.  
Recently, sixty-five percent of Thai citizens believe the government's efforts against 
corruption are “ineffective,” according to a Transparency International poll.169  The 
Thai people's negative view is reflective of the National Counter Corruption 
Commission (NCCC); the NCCC is the main coordinator of all anti-corruption 
efforts and agencies in Thailand and currently filters all corruption complaints.170  
Unfortunately, even the NCCC has been disgraced with charges of corruption, 
resulting in the termination of several commissioners for increasing their own 
salaries in 2004.171   
 
 However, most recently, Thailand proposed the pioneering Public Anti-
Corruption Commission (PACC). 172   The Commission plans to post 2,000 
                                                 
 165   See id. 
166   See infra pp. 23. 
 167    See Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister, Kingdom of Thailand, Keynote Speech at the 
International Anti-Corruption Conference: Momentum for Change: Take Action Against Corruption 
(Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://media.thaigov.go.th/pageconfig/viewcontent/viewcontent1e.asp?pageid=472&directory=194
2&contents=51144 [hereinafter Keynote Speech]. 
 168   See id. 
 169    Patrick Winn, What's Thai for Chicago-style Politics?, GLOBAL POST , Nov. 24, 2009, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/thailand/091119/thailands-anti-corruption-war-
pressess?page=0,0. 
 170   See id. 
 171   See id. 
 172   See id. 
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government-paid investigators to monitor and respond to allegations of corruption 
throughout the country.173 
  
 Philip Guentert, a United States federal prosecutor detailed to the United 
States Embassy in Bangkok believes that, “[t]he [anti-corruption commission] is 
really the best bet to deal with [the] lowest levels of police corruption.”174  Guentert 
is helping to train the investigators on how to build anti-corruption cases.  He is, 
however, quite aware that he and the commission face a long road to redemption.175  
The challenge lies in the corruption’s inherent sneakiness, such as everyday bribe 
requests from street cops.176  Reform will come from the bottom up to rid the nation 
of the "pettiest and most visible bribery"177 and reverse Thailand’s "bad" image.178  
By researching more citizens' allegations and developing more investigations in 
provinces where federal oversight is lacking, 179  the PACC intends to attack and 
address these instances of petty, but prevalent, demonstrations of corruption by 
Royal Thai policemen and low-level government officials.180 
 
 To date, the PACC has undertaken different investigations seeking to 
suppress graft and implement an anti-corruption agenda.  Specifically, the PACC 
joined efforts with the DSI to crackdown on backstreet lending, which has inundated 
low-income borrowers with insurmountable debt. 181   The PACC has also taken 
efforts to ensure transparency in flood relief spending.182  In 2010, floods devastated 
thirty-eight provinces, claiming ninety-four lives.183  The PACC worked to ensure 
that the required funds were properly used as emergency assistance for flood 
victims.184  The PACC has also investigated suspicious issuing of land title deeds.185  
For example, a PACC investigator discovered that land officially given to local 
farmers under a government agricultural reform project was actually used to build a 
                                                 
 173   See id. 
 174  Winn, supra note 169.  While in the United States, Guentert built corruption cases against 
Chicago politicians, including former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich.  See id.  Guentert now advises 
anti-graft cases in Asia.  See id.   
 175   See id. 
 176   See id. 
 177   Id. 
 178   Id. 
 179 See Winn, supra note 169. 
 180   See id. 
 181   See Loan Sharks Face Govt Crackdown Three Crime-Fighting Agencies Join Forces, BANGKOK 
POST, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/32807/loan-sharks-face-govt-
crackdown. 
 182   See Graft Agency Checks Flood Cash PACC Teams Will Head to Ravaged Provinces, BANGKOK 
POST, Oct. 30, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/203921/graft-agency-checks-flood-
cash. 
 183   See id. 
 184   See id. 
 185  See PACC Uncovers Flood Relief Graft, Plus Illegal ID-Cards, NATION (BANGKOK), Jan. 4, 
2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/01/04/national/PACC-uncovers-flood-relief-graft-
plus-illegal-ID-c-30145633.html.  The PACC is also investigating allegations that Thai identity cards 
have been issued to known drug dealers.   
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golf course.186  Such efforts demonstrate that though the PACC is in its formative 
period, its potential is promising.  
 
 Encouraging citizens to report instances of corruption is a significant leap 
forward towards successful corruption reform.  A cultural and societal revolution 
requires not only legislation and government, but also the desire and cooperation of 
an entire society, beginning with the private sector. 187   Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva urges, 
 
Businesses are both perpetrators and victims of corruption. In spite 
of an increasingly stringent legal framework, corruption remains a 
challenge for companies in many parts of the world.  Indeed, there is 
little incentive for an individual company to take an anti-corruption 
stance in a disconnected business world.  Responsible enterprises that 
take a zero tolerance stance on bribery and corruption find it very 
challenging to live up to this commitment in countries or industries 
where bribery is pervasive and extortion is a routine occurrence.  
There is thus greater need than ever for a clear demonstration of 
ethical business leadership.188 
 
Along with government-implemented reform, there are calls for action from the 
private sector, including the Thai Institute of Directors, to help restore government 
credibility and dependability. 
 
C.  Private Sector's Role in Corruption Reform in Thailand 
 
 Corruption in Thailand not only affects the government and its citizens, but  
also has a negative impact on the country's economy.189  However, unlike other 
developing countries, the private sector has not always been the source of corruption 
in Thailand.190  In fact, in Thailand, the private sector plays opposing roles as both 
victim and benefactor of corruption.191  Nonetheless, pressing the private sector to 
take a leading role in combating corruption is crucial in Thailand, where political 
turmoil has led to many shifts in power and policies over the past century.192  In 
essence, the private sector can continue to drive the anti-corruption campaign, in 
conjunction with government agencies, in times when political debate can stall 
reforms. 193   Under the strategy of "Collective Action Against Corruption," 194  the 
private sector has begun efforts against corruption, drawing the joint forces of 
                                                 
 186  See id. 
 187  See Keynote Speech, supra note 167. 
 188       See id. 
 189   See Fighting Corruption in Thailand: Help Wanted From the Private Sector, NATION (BANGKOK), 
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/09/29/opinion/Fighting-
corruption-in-Thailand-help-wanted-from-t-30138915.html. 
190  See id. 
 191   See id. 
 192   See id. 
 193   See id. 
 194   Keynote Speech, supra note 167. 
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companies, governments, and civil society organizations to promote transparency in 
business.     
  
 One such effort is the Thai Institute of Directors (IOD).195  IOD is a not-
for-profit, membership organization, established with assistance from Thailand 
capital market institutions such as the U.S. (?) Securities and Exchange Commission, 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand, The Bank of Thailand, and the Foundation for 
Capital Market Development Fund, as well as international organizations such as the 
World Bank.196  IOD's main mission is to improve professionalism and corporate 
governance among directors of Thai businesses.197   
  
 IOD was established in 1999, and since its inception, IOD has been at the 
forefront of promoting good governance practices in Thai companies.198   IOD's 
ideology is that effective directors produce well operated companies, which in turn 
benefit shareholder value and sustainable growth of the Thai economy. 199   To 
accomplish its goal, IOD conducts several key courses, which teach managing skills 
and knowledge of good corporate governance essential for board members to 
improve and develop their companies. 200   Additionally, IOD keeps its seminars 
"current," consistently updating course content concerning the most recent issues in 
corporate governance.201 
 
 Similar to ILEA and the PACC, IOD is an example of another innovative 
reform measure in Thailand.  Each of the three remedial measures attempts to curtail 
corruption at its root.  ILEA targets unprincipled law enforcement,202 PACC focuses 
on crooked government actions,203 and IOD aims at unethical business practices.204  
These initiatives are three examples of developing strategies in the ongoing campaign 
against corruption in Thailand. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In Thailand, corruption occurs at all levels, implicating both the public and 
private sectors.  The universal misconduct in turn affects all classes of citizens, 
including government officials, businesspersons, and ordinary citizens both at home 
and abroad. 
  
 The Blue Diamond Affair accurately depicts the pervasiveness of corruption 
in Thailand.  The Blue Diamond Affair's web entangles an extensive class of citizens, 
                                                 
 195  See THAI INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS, http://www.thai-iod.com/en/index.asp (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter THAI INSTITUTE OF DIRECTOR]. 
 196   See id. 
 197   See id. 
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ranging from Saudi royalty to Thai migrant workers.  The jewelry heist not only 
affected the crime's players and investigators, but also has disturbed the lives of 
innocent bystanders.       
 
 The events and aftermath of the Blue Diamond Affair suggest that a 
significant vulnerability of Thai civil society is the Royal Thai Police Force's statutes 
and regulations.  Current protocol of the Royal Thai Police Force nurtures the 
practice of torture, undermines the importance of witness protection, compromises 
the role of prosecutors, and promotes corrupt state agents.  Thailand's economic and 
diplomatic development is inhibited by the continuation of these practices, as 
demonstrated most critically by its inability to renew diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia.   
 
 When such problems exist and corruption is so embedded within a society, 
remedial reform requires a nationwide cooperative effort to rid the country of the 
societal epidemic.  Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva explained it best, urging "the 
need for greater cooperation with civil society.  As a direct beneficiary of any 
effective anti-corruption program, civil society has always been a main driving force 
in raising awareness of corruption and its harmful effects."205 
 
 Accordingly, Thai civil society has begun to take the proper steps for the 
necessary overhaul and revitalized agenda for the Republic of Thailand.  The reform 
measures in place encompass a wide range of contributors, each providing skills, 
expertise and fresh perspectives.  Remedial programs include ILEA, which provides 
law enforcement and criminal investigation expertise; the PACC, which encourages 
citizen involvement in the effort to intercept and deter corrupt practices of the Thai 
government; and the IOD, which provides the collaborative effort of industry 
leaders to combat the prevalence of corruption and unethical business practices. 
 
 To succeed, Thailand must continue collaborative efforts to empower each 
citizen as an official mouthpiece for the subjugated and as a recognized 
whistleblower against the corrupt.  Citizen-centric empowerment can be 
reached through a strong alliance of government officials, law enforcement officers, 
business people, and motivated citizens of Thailand.  Thailand requires an all-
encompassing proactive campaign for change to transform Thailand’s overall 
apathetic acceptance of corruption into a universal determined drive for reform and 
reconstruction.  Such a unified effort will lead Thailand to a more promising future; a 
future free from unanswered instances of corruption, as witnessed in the unsolved 
case of the Blue Diamond Affair.  
 
 
                                                 
 205   Keynote Speech, supra note 167. 
